## MOOD MARKERS AND EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVES

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There is no doubt that at the present stage of research the problem concerning various aspects of the meaning of non-declarative sentences (non-indicative moods) and the illocutionary forces they convey is one of the major topics of semantics (cf. Wunderlich 1976). We are accustomed, at least since Austin, to the fact that there are two linguistically different ways to express a given illocutionary force : either by *mood markers* - syntactic or morphological devices natural languages dispose of in order to construct interrogatives, imperatives and other types of sentences -, or by use of performative verbs.

The discovery of (explicit) performative verbs gave rise to some kind of identification of sentences having mood overtly marked with corresponding sentences having an explicit performative verb. Some logic and linguistic approaches attempt to describe questions and orders for example, with the help of such performative verbs as to ask and to order respectively. Arguments and pseudo-arguments of various forces have been put forward to support such claims. Among these the major one seems to be that sentences such as (la) and sentences such as (lb) are semantically identical :

(1a) I order you to close the door.(1b) Close the door !

From the logical point of view it is easy to find several differences between the two types of sentences (cf. Gazdar 1976). The purpose of this paper is to show that these two types of sentences are in fact different if one describes them in terms of the notions of semantic presupposition and assertion. I am going to justify the following claim : the illocutionary force associated with the sentence which has its mood morphologically marked is *presupposed*, whereas the illocutionary force associated with an explicit performative is *asserted* or stated explicitly. Thus, I will say that in (lb) the order is presupposed whereas in (la) it is asserted. Similarly with (2a) and (2b) : the direct question (2b) is a sentence in which the illocutionary force of interrogation is presupposed whereas in (2a) this force is explicitly stated :

(2a) I ask you (to tell me) who came ?
(2b) Who came ?

Of course in order to be able to justify my claim I need a general definition of presupposition, one that can apply to any sentence whether declarative or non-declarative.

 Before giving such a definition of presupposition, I would like to make some introductory remarks about presuppositions of a particular class of declarative sentences, that is presuppositions which are obtained from the so-called factive verbs.

In my opinion, it has never been sufficiently pointed out that factive verbs constitute a sub-class of the verbs of propositional attitude, and that as such they form a class of opaque sentential operators. Further more, that these operators are opaque in a stronger way that (for instance) modal operators : the opacity of propositional attitude verbs can be detected by sentences which are not necessarily true or necessarily false, in contrast to the opacity of modal operators. Thus to show that the modal operator *It is necessary that* is an opaque operator we need to use as one of the changing sentential arguments a sentence which is logically true : the sentence form (3) can have different truth values when P is replaced by two sentences which have the same truth value at a given possible world, but one of the replacing argument sentences *must* be necessarily true :

## (3) It is necessarily true that P.

If both of the substitute argument sentences are contingent, the two sentences thus obtained from (3) must have the same truth value - false - and as a result the opacity of the modal operator cannot be detected. This is not the case with the propositional attitude operators : their opacity can always be "realized" by two contingent sentences. For instance (4a) and (4b) can differ in their truth value at a given world w, even if their complement sentences have the same truth value at w and neither of these is logically true or logically false :

(4a) Steve thinks that Susan came.

(4b) Steve thinks that the girl I met came.

It is easy to construct similar examples with other verbs of propositional attitudes. This means that the opacity to which these verbs give rise is different from the opacity generated by modal operators. We will call this type of opacity - that is the one exhibited by the verbs of propositional attitude - *normal opacity*. More precisely I will say that the sentential operator O is normally opaque iff for every possible world w there exist two sentences P and P' which are true at w but O(P) and O(P') have different truth values at w.

Clearly factive verbs can be considered as forming normally opaque operators (when they are used with their subject). They have however an additional property which is that they semantically imply their sentential complement : the operator O is a factive operator iff O is normally opaque and O(P) semantically implies P.

Before showing that factive verbs as just defined do share the semantic properties of the "classical" factives, I want to make one remark about the notion of negation. From the most natural point of view, the "normal" negation of a complex sentence composed of a sentential operator and its argument can be viewed as an operator which applies to the given sentential operator and gives a "new" composed sentential operator which has the same argument as the corresponding non-negated sentence. For instance the negation of (4a) gives (4c) where *does not think* is a new sentential operator :

(4c) Steve does not think that Susan came.

For this reason, a negation which applies to a normally opaque operator can be considered from the semantic point of view as not altering the opacity of the operator to which it applies : if 0 is normally opaque then neg-0 is also normally opaque. The negation understood in this way will be called *normal negation*. It is possible now to show that if O is a factive operator then neg-O(P) implies P (where neg-O is the normal negation of O): suppose that this is not the case. Then there would be a world w in which neg-O(P) is true and P is false. Since neg-O is normally opaque, this means that there is a sentence P' with the same truth value as Pat w and such that O(P') is true. But this is impossible, because if O(P') is true, then P' must also be true. Consequently neg-O(P) also semantically implies P. Which amounts to saying that O(P) presupposes P.

The particular case of factive verbs just analysed shows that the notion of normal opacity is essentially linked with the notion of presupposition, or the other way around, that presuppositions exist because some operators are normally opaque or can be interpreted as being normally opaque. In fact it is possible to define presupposition in the following way (cf. Zuber, to appear) :

> Sentence S presupposes sentence T iff every complex sentence of the form O(S), where O is any normally opaque operator, semantically implies T.

This definition can be applied in a straightforward way to any non-declarative sentence which is morphologically marked.

2. It is possible and relatively easy to apply the above definition of presupposition to non-declarative sentences, because these sentences, of whatever type or illocutionary force, have their declarative counterparts in the form of a complex sentence formed from the given non-declarative sentence plus a sentential operator which is normally opaque and which is applied to the given non-declarative sentence. A well-known case is the case of questions : all direct, morphologically marked questions which have as their counterpart the so-called indirect questions : (5b) corresponds to (5a) and (6b) corresponds to (6a):

- (5a) Who came ?
- (5b) We don't know who came ?
- (6a) Will Bill come ?
- (6b) Susan doesn't remember whether Bill will come or not ?

What is interesting is the fact that all question-embedding verbs, i.e.

all verbs which can be used to form indirect questions, form together with their subjects normally opaque sentential operators. Here is a sample : remember, forget, learn, notice, find out, guess, wonder, decide, inform, agree on, etc. It is easy to verify that all these verbs can give rise to normally opaque operators. This is partly because all of them involve in some sense knowledge, and the human subject not being omniscient, opacity occurs. Thus for instance (7a) and (7b) can also differ in their truth value even if Susan and the girl I met refer to the same person :

(7a) Bill learned whether Susan came.

(7b) Bill learned whether the girl I met came.

Since indirect questions can often be used with the same purpose as direct ones, or in other words since indirect questions can carry the illocutionary force of interrogation in a way similar to that of direct questions, we can say that indirect questions imply, in an informal way, the illocutionary force proper to the direct questions. In other words, indirect questions imply the existence of the corresponding direct questions.

But this means, according to our definition of presupposition, that this force is presupposed.

Orders or rather imperative sentences, can also be analysed in a similar way. Imperatives like (8) have corresponding opaque sentences like (8a) or (8b) :

- (8) Close the door !
- (8a) I want you to close the door.
- (8b) He wishes that you close the door.

Here also the only verbs which can take "direct" imperatives as complements are normally opaque verbs like to wish, to want, to desire. When such a direct imperative is embedded in one of these verbs, the illocutionary force of the order or command is preserved, which means that this force, according to our definition, is presupposed.

Finally, there is another class of non-declarative sentences which behave in a similar way. I am thinking about exclamations like in (9) and (10) and optatives like in (11) :

- (9) How stupid he is !
- (10) How fast Bill can mon !
- (11) If only she were pretty !

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These non-declarative sentences differ from interrogatives and imperatives by the fact that they do not have the corresponding performative counterparts. This does not prevent them however, especially exclamatives, to have the corresponding indirect counterparts formed by a normally opaque operator (cf. Elliott 1974, Grimshaw 1979). Thus complements in (12) and (13) have an exclamative reading parallel to the reading of (9) and (10) respectively :

(12) I am surprised at how stupid he is.

(13) It is amazing how fast Bill can run.

Although the exclamatives can share their embedding verbs with questions in many cases, there exist various syntactic means for differentiating exclamations from questions in embedding constructions. In both cases however, in the case of questions as well as in the case of exclamatives, the embedding verb can form with its subject a normally opaque operator. Since in this case also the complex sentences do carry in general the illocutionary force of the morphologically marked embedded sentence, we see that this force is presupposed.

3. In this section I would like to give some additional, less formal arguments which support my claim. These concern the fact that presuppositions as well as illocutionary forces induced by morphological marks can disappear in some contexts. Indeed, it is known that the illocutionary force of questions for instance, is not always given directly by indirect questions :

- (14) I know who will come.
- (15) Steve discovered who did it.
- (16) She doesn't remember whether he won.
- (17) Steve asked whether John is stupid.

In composed sentences forming indirect questions the embedded questions can lose the force of interrogation; (14) - (17) are not questions demanding an answer in the way in which the corresponding embedded questions are. In the same way imperatives can lose the force of an order in some contexts

- (18) Close the door if you want.
- (19) When he comes, close the door.

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We know that normally opaque verbs permit double, opaque or referential and transparent or attributive readings of the complement sentences. The most natural reading is the transparent one but when the opaque reading occurs, presuppositions of the complement sentences are blocked. For instance (20) has probably the opaque reading given by (21) and on this reading this sentence does not entail (22), a presupposition of the complement sentence :

(20) Steve thinks that a girl who came didn't come.
(21) Steve thinks that some girl didn't come.
(22) A girl came.

Now opaque readings, when possible, are possible when the main verb has "non-first" person subject or non-present tense; with first person subject and present tense only the transparent reading is possible. But precisely indirect questions do not express requests for answers when they contain the non-first person subject.

There is another case when presuppositions can be cancelled or neutralised. Among various contexts, there are some called *filters* where such a neutralisation of presuppositions takes place (Karttunen 1973, Zuber 1979). Conditional sentences (or rather *if...then* connective) form classical examples of filters. One can observe that sentences with the mood morphologically marked and corresponding sentences with explicit performative verbs do not behave in the same way in the context of the *if... then* connective. We have seen that this is true for imperative sentences (cf. (18) and (19)). This is also true for interrogative sentences :

(23) If I ask you who came then who came ?

(24) If I promise to come who else will come ?

Sentence (23) is very strange as to its pragmatic and semantic status; it does not seem to convey the force of a question and surely it does not request an answer; (24) on the other hand is clearly a question with a request for an answer. This difference between the two sentences can be easily understood if we recall the mecanism of neutralisation of presupposition by filters (in this case by the if...then connective) : the presupposition of the consequent clause is neutralised when it is semantically implied by the antecedent clause. According to the claim defended here, a question morphologically marked has its question force presupposed and the corresponding explicit performative has its question force asserted. Consequently the presupposed question force of the consequent clause of (23) is neutralised as the antecedent contains an explicit performative verb. In (24) the situation is different; the question force of the consequent clause is not neutralised since we do not have in the antecedent a performative verb with the force of the same type as the force of the consequent clause. Thus the illocutionary force presupposed by the consequent clause is not entailed by the antecedent.

Another argument can be based on the behaviour of adverbial clauses which can be used to detect presuppositions. It is known that adverbial clauses usually modify the asserted and not the presupposed part of the "argument" to which they apply. For instance a *because*-clause usually modifies the assertion of the antecedent sentence :

(25) Steve came alone because his wife is ill.

The reason clause in this sentence justifies not Steve's coming (presupposition) but his coming alone. This property of reason clauses can be used to support our claim :

- (26) I order you to close the door because I am your boss.
- (27) Close the door because I am your boss.
- (28) Why are you here because you should be at home.
- (29) I ask you why are you here because you should be at home.

Sentences (27) and (28) are rather strange and require for their interpretation supplementary information which is not necessary for the immediate interpretation of (26) and (29).

My next argument has to do with the negation of explicit performatives and corresponding sentences with morphologically marked mood. The behaviour of the natural negation is usually considered as essential in detecting presuppositions; they are supposed to be out of the scope of negation in the case where normal negation is applied to the sentence. When we compare two types of constructions, explicit performatives and mood markers, the desired differences appear. For instance, it is rather difficult to negate an interrogative or imperative sentence so as to deprive it of its illocutionary force. The following sentences can still be considered as interrogative or imperative :

- (30) Who did not come ?
- (31) Didn't he come ?
- (32) Don't close the door !

Concerning explicit performatives it is well known that they lose their illocutionary force when negation is directly applied to them. Examples (33), (34) and (35) are clear in this respect :

- (33) I don't ask you to close the door.
- (34) I do not order you to close the door.
- (35) I do not promise you to come.

These sentences cannot be used to accomplish the speech acts proper to their performative verbs; illocutionary forces induced by overt performatives behave like an assertion.

The last argument I would like to mention concerns the possibility of there being derived or indirect speech acts. We know that some sentences marked for one act can be interpreted as if they were marked for another, in principle different, speech act. What is interesting is the fact that we have such a possibility only with morphologically marked sentences and not with sentences whose force is induced by an overt performative verb. Thus only (36a) and not (36b) can be interpreted as indirect order or request; (36b) remains a question in all situations :

(36a) Can you close the door ?

(36b) I ask you (to tell me) if you can close the door.

Of course it is still not quite clear what exactly is going on "during" the derivation of indirect speech acts. One can notice however (cf. Zuber 1980) that usually the derived speech act is based on the presupposition and not on the assertion of the original, "direct" speech act. If this is indeed the case then we can more easily understand the phenomenon illustrated by (36a) and (36b) : only the former sentence permits an indirect interpretation, since this interpretation is based on the presupposed material and not on the asserted material, as in the latter sentence.

I will conclude by two rather general remarks. The morphological 4 marks which are carried by non-declarative sentences can be considered as particular cases of morphological marks which in the general case induce what can be called "grammatical meaning". We know that there are other marks than those corresponding to illocutionary forces having their counterparts among performative verbs. So the question one would like to ask is whether other marks, those used for marking tenses, aspects, causativity, etc., can be analysed in the same way. To answer this question affirmatively, we must show that such morphologically marked sentences have corresponding complex sentences where the grammatical meaning is lexically expressed and which contain normally opaque operators. It seems to me, however, that it is not true in general that there exist such "lexically" equivalent sentences. For instance, even if we admit that in some languages the grammatical causatives have their lexical counterparts, these lexical elements do not constitute normally opaque operators. The two following sentences see to me to have the same truth value in a given possible world in which the corresponding noun phrases, Susan and the girl I met, refer to the same person :

(37a) Bill caused Susan to leave.(37b) Bill caused the girl I met to leave.

Similarly when one tries to interpret tenses by some lexically complete expressions of the type In the past or In the future or by some "simple" adverbs, one finds that these lexical expressions are not in general normally opaque. So the analysis here proposed does not apply to all cases of morphological marks.

My last remark concerns the type of relation which exists between sentences with overt performatives and the corresponding non-declarative sentences. The proposition I tried to defend here does not contradict the affirmation that there exists some non-trivial relation between the two types of sentences. And clearly this cannot be the relation of semantic consequence since such a relation is probably not possible to be defined for nondeclarative sentences. So what is this relation ? I think that this is the relation of *being more explicit* as defined in Keenan (1973). According to this definition, a sentence S is more explicit than a sentence T when both sentences have the same set of consequences (assertions plus presuppositions) but some presuppositions of T are asserted by S. If we suppose that the set of assertions of non-declarative sentences is empty, then according to my proposition an explicit performative sentence is more explicit than the corresponding non-declarative sentence, since it asserts some presuppositions of the non-declarative counterpart.

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